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Abstract
Virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge claim that knowledge
is a species of a broader normative category, to wit of success from
ability. Fake Barn cases pose a difficult problem for such accounts.
In structurally analogous but non-epistemic cases, the agents attain the
relevant success from ability. If knowledge is just another form of suc-
cess from ability, the pressure is on to treat Fake Barn cases as cases
of knowledge. The challenge virtue epistemology faces is to explain
the intuitive lack of knowledge in Fake Barn cases, whilst holding on
to the core claim that knowledge is success from ability. Ernest Sosa’s
version of virtue epistemology promises to rise to this challenge. Sosa
distinguishes two types of knowledge, animal knowledge and reflec-
tive knowledge. He argues that while animal knowledge is present in
Fake Barn cases, reflective knowledge is absent and ventures to explain
the intuition of ignorance by the absence of reflective knowledge. This
paper argues that Sosa’s treatment of Fake Barn cases fails as it com-
mits Sosa to a number of highly counterintuitive results elsewhere in
epistemology.
1 Introduction
What is knowledge? It will come as no surprise that this is one of the core
questions in the theory of knowledge. What is perhaps more surprising is
how difficult it is to provide a satisfactory answer to it. Since Gettier’s cel-
ebrated [1963] counterexamples to the then received view that knowledge is
justified true belief, the epistemological literature has featured a long list of
proposed accounts of knowledge and an almost equally long list of Gettier-
style counterexamples to these accounts.
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That said, some promising candidates have surfaced in recent years. Am-
ong them are virtue epistemological accounts. The core idea of virtue epis-
temology (VE) is that knowledge is a species of a broader normative genus,
to wit, success from ability or competence. More specifically, virtue episte-
mologists maintain that knowledge is cognitive success (true belief) that is
attained because of cognitive ability. This account of knowledge, they argue,
will enable us to solve a number of core problems in epistemology, including
the Gettier problem.1
VE’s core idea carries some promise. To see this, consider first Chisholm’s
[1966] classic case:
Sheep. Mutton, a reliable sheep-spotter, sees a sheep-shaped object and comes to
believe that there is a sheep ahead. Unbekownst to Mutton, the object he is
looking at is not a sheep but a dog in fancy dress. At the same time, Mutton’s
belief is nonetheless true as there happens to be a sheep hidden from view
behind the dog.
Mutton’s belief falls short of knowledge. According to a widely accepted
diagnosis, the reason for this is that it is pure luck that his belief is true.
Notice also that Mutton’s cognitive performance is tarnished as it involves
him mistaking a non-sheep for a sheep. We may thus want to say that Mutton
is lucky to attain cognitive success in the sense that he succeeds despite his
tarnished cognitive performance.
Crucially, second, it is independently plausible that success because of
ability contrasts with lucky success of this kind, i.e. success despite tarnished
performance. By way of evidence, consider Archer who produces a com-
petent shot which is first blown off target by a freak gust of wind and then
brought back on target by a second freak gust. Even though Archer’s shot
is successful, it is not successful because of ability. Notice also just how
appealing the parallel diagnosis is: the reason why Archer is not successful
because of ability is that it is pure luck that his shot hits the target. Moreover,
Archer’s athletic performance is tarnished also as it involves a shot that has
been blown off target. Archer, too, is lucky to attain the relevant success in
the sense that he succeeds despite his tarnished performance.
If, as VE would have it, (VE1) knowledge is success from ability; if
(VE2) success from ability is incompatible with success despite tarnished
performance; and if (VE3) Gettier cases are cases of success despite tar-
nished performance, it looks as though VE has what it takes to explain why
agents in Gettier cases lack knowledge.
1 Another central problem VE has been claimed to solve is the value problem. For more
on this, see e.g. [Greco 2010a,b, Riggs 2002].
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But now consider another prominent Gettier case, which is due to Alvin
Goldman [1976] (who in turn attributes it to Carl Ginet):
Barns. Barnes, a reliable barn-spotter, drives through the countryside, sees a barn
in the field to the right and forms a true belief that he is facing a barn. Unbe-
knownst to Barnes, he is looking at the only real barn in a field otherwise full
of fake barns that are so cleverly constructed as to be indistinguishable from
real barns from Barnes’s position on the road.
Barnes’s belief falls short of knowledge. Moreover, the above diagnosis is
still plausible: it is pure luck that Barnes believes truly here. In these respects,
Barns is analogous to Sheep.
At the same time, there is an important structural difference between
Barns and standard Gettier cases like Sheep: in Barns the agent’s perfor-
mance is not tarnished.2 Unlike Mutton, who mistakes a non-sheep for a
sheep, Barnes does not mistake a fake barn for a real barn. Of course, he
might so easily have looked at a fake instead in which case he would have
made a similar mistake as Mutton. However, as a matter of fact, he does not.
What is going on in Barns, then, is that Barnes’s cognitive performance is un-
tarnished but might so easily have been tarnished. As a result, (VE3) is false:
Gettier cases need not be cases of success despite tarnished performance.
Rather cases in which the agent’s successful performance is untarnished but
might easily have been tarnished will do as well.
This means trouble for VE. Here is why. While agents who succeed de-
spite tarnished performance generally don’t succeed because of ability, there
is excellent evidence that agents who succeed via untarnished performances
that might easily have been tarnished generally do succeed because of ability.
Just think of a case in which Archer produces a successful shot at a normal
target when shooting at the only unsabotaged target at a shooting range other-
wise full of sabotaged targets; think of Chef who successfully prepares a tasty
omelette but happened to take the only salt shaker in which the salt wasn’t
replaced by sugar; or think of Artist who successfully produces a beautiful
monochrome after having taken the only can in which the colour wasn’t re-
placed by acid. In all of these cases, the agents produce performances that
are untarnished but might easily have been tarnished. At the same time, it is
intuitively clear that they succeed because of ability. If, as VE would have
it, knowledge is a species of success because of ability, we have excellent
reason to believe that VE will predict, incorrectly, that Barnes knows that he
is facing a barn. If so, VE succumbs to Gettier-style counterexample after
2 For alternative accounts of this difference see [Hetherington 1999] and [Pritchard 2008].
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all.3
Can VE avoid this difficulty? That is to say, is it possible for virtue epis-
temologists to treat cases like Barns analogously to the cases of Archer, Chef
and Artist as cases of success because of ability, whilst explaining the intu-
ition that Barnes lacks knowledge? One might think that the answer to these
questions has to be ‘no’. However, Ernest Sosa has recently offered a version
of VE that suggests otherwise. His account will be the main focus of this pa-
per. I will argue that this answer, while initially promising, does not stand up
to closer scrutiny. In order to achieve this, it will be necessary to first outline
Sosa’s virtue epistemology and his account of Barns (and similar cases) in
more detail.
2 Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology
2.1 . . . In Outline
Sosa [2007, 2010, 2011] offers an account of the normativity of performances
with an aim. According to Sosa, performances with an aim fall under ‘AAA
structure’. This means they can be evaluated in terms of whether they at-
tain the aim (i.e. whether they are successful), whether they are adroit (i.e.
whether they manifest competence) and whether they are apt (i.e. whether
they are successful because competent). For instance, the aim of a shot in
target archery is to hit the target. To say that a shot in target archery falls
under AAA structure is to say that it can be evaluated in terms of whether it
hits the target, whether it is competent and whether it hits the target because
it is competent.
3 Pritchard et al. [2010], Pritchard [2012]. Some champions of VE (most notably Greco
[2007, 2010a]) respond by holding that Barnes does not even have the ability to form true
beliefs about the presence of barns in fake barn county. However, this move is not particu-
larly attractive. Among the undesirable consequences it brings in its trail are: (i) It fails to
treat like cases alike. (ii) It threatens to render Mutton epistemically better off than Barnes.
After all, Mutton but not Barnes has and exercises the kind of cognitive ability required for
knowledge. Relatedly, (iii) Greco’s move threatens to render Barnes’s belief unjustified. Ac-
cording to a plausible virtue epistemological account of justified belief, a belief is justified
just in case it is the product of the kind of cognitive ability required for knowing. Given that,
in Barns, Barnes does not have the relevant ability, his belief turns out unjustified. Finally,
(iv) if it is not entirely ad hoc, it must be supported by an independent argument. However,
this threatens to smuggle in covert additional conditions on knowledge that do part of the
anti-Gettier duty. If so, VE is compromised, at least in the sense that it cannot be the full
epistemological story about knowledge. This might in turn mean that other parts of VE’s
story will no longer work in the way envisaged. In particular, I am thinking here of the kind
of account of the value of knowledge favoured by Greco [e.g. 2010a, 2010b], which crucially
depends on VE’s condition being not only necessary but also sufficient for knowledge.
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Competences, according to Sosa, are dispositions to perform well. That
is to say, competences are dispositions that issue performances that, in turn,
are likely to be successful.
Dispositions have three essential components: a constitution component
(CO), a condition (or shape) component (SH) and a situation component (SI).
For instance, a match’s disposition of being flammable has as its constitution
component certain physical and chemical properties of the powdery head.
These properties constitute the seat of the disposition. Its condition com-
ponent includes, among other things, being dry, and its situation component
includes being in oxygen [Sosa 2010: 465].
Dispositions also “correspond to” trigger-manifestation conditionals. In
the case of our match’s flammability, this conditional is: if it were struck it
would likely light. The idea here seems to be that a disposition corresponds to
a trigger-manifestation conditional if and only if that conditional must be true
of the object satisfying CO and being in SH and SI. To say that the match’s
flammability corresponds to the conditional ‘if it were struck it would likely
light’ is to say that this conditional must be true of any match the powdery
head of which has the relevant physical and chemical properties, which is
dry, etc., and which is in oxygen, etc. [Sosa 2010: 466].
Since competences are dispositions, they also feature CO, SH and SI
components and correspond to trigger-manifestation conditionals of the form:
if the disposition were to issue a performance, the performance would likely
be successful. In the case of archery competence, the CO are certain prop-
erties of the agent, including more basic motor and cognitive competences,
the SH include being awake and sober and the SI include there being enough
light and normal winds. Furthermore, since the performances the disposi-
tion issues here are shots and successes hits, it corresponds to the following
trigger-manifestation conditional: if the agent were to take a shot, he would
likely hit the target. So, a competent archer is an agent who has certain prop-
erties such that when awake, sober, etc. and there is enough light, winds are
normal, etc., he would likely hit the target were he to shoot at it [Sosa 2010:
466].
Sosa also distinguishes between three different levels of competence:
first, the constitutional competence which consists of the constitutional com-
ponent of the agent’s disposition (CO); second, the inner competence which
combines the constitutional component with the shape component (CO and
SH); and, third, the complete competence which, besides the constitutional
and the shape components, also includes the situational component (CO, SH
and SI). On this picture, it is of course the complete competence that corre-
sponds to the trigger-manifestation conditional [Sosa 2010: 465].
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According to Sosa, a performance is successful because competent or
apt if and only if its success manifests the agent’s competence. With the
above account of competence in play, we can say a bit more about what that
means. Crucially, aptness is unpacked in terms of the notion of a complete
competence: “A performance is apt,” Sosa tells us, ”if and only if its success
manifests a complete competence.” [Sosa 2010: 470] Aptness thus requires
that that the relevant disposition’s CO, SH and SI are in place. Suppose,
for instance, that an agent is a competent archer in virtue of having certain
properties such that when awake, sober, etc. and there is enough light, winds
are normal, etc., he would likely hit the target were he to shoot at it. In that
case, any shot he fires will be apt only if he is in fact awake, sober, etc. and
there is in fact enough light, winds are normal, etc. Any shot he fires while
drunk, in darkness or in abnormal winds will not qualify as apt.
Crucially, according to Sosa, beliefs are performances with an aim. More
specifically, the aim of belief is truth [Sosa 2011: 1]. In consequence, beliefs
too fall under AAA structure. They can be evaluated in terms of whether they
attain the aim of truth, whether they are adroit or competent, and whether they
are apt or true because competent. Unsurprisingly, Sosa’s suggestion is that
knowledge is apt belief.
This account of competences can be applied to the kinds of competences
required for knowing (‘cognitive competences’) in the following way: Cog-
nitive competences are dispositions of agents featuring CO, SH and SI. Since
the performances these dispositions issue are beliefs and successes are truths,
they correspond to the following kind of trigger-manifestation conditional: if
the agent were to believe a proposition within a certain range, he would likely
believe truly. For instance, an agent has a cognitive competence to spot barns
just in case he has certain properties such that when in suitable SH (awake,
sober, etc.) and SI (sufficient light, etc.), if he were to believe that a barn
is present, his belief would likely be true. Of course, in case of cognitive
competence, too, the three levels of competence (constitutional, inner and
complete) can be distinguished. Crucially, for cognitive competences, too,
aptness requires that the agent’s success manifests a complete competence.
In consequence, any belief formed in untoward SH or SI is bound to fall short
of knowledge, no matter whether it is adroit and/or turns out to be true.
2.2 . . . And Fake Barn Cases
With Sosa’s virtue epistemology in play, let’s return to Barns. How can Sosa
accommodate the intuition of ignorance in here? Sosa tackles this question
by introducing a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowl-
edge. While animal knowledge is first-order apt belief, reflective knowledge
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is meta-apt belief. Meta-apt belief involves the manifestation of a second-
order cognitive competence, which is, in essence, a monitoring competence.
More specifically, according to Sosa, the relevant second-order competences
are “default competences” in the sense that they assume (by default) that the
complete first-order competence is present, unless there are indications to the
contrary [Sosa 2010: 473]. Like their first-order cousins, second-order com-
petences come in three varieties: constitutional, inner and complete. Here,
too, the constitutional competence consists in the seat of the competence
(CO) only, the inner combines the seat and the inner component (CO and
SH) and the complete competence includes, in addition, the situational com-
petent (CO, SH and SI). According to Sosa, the SI of second-order cognitive
competences include the following condition:
Tell-Tale Signs (TTS). “[O]ne must be so situated that sooner or later there would be
tell-tale signs if the relevant [complete] first-order competence were absent.”
[Sosa 2010: 473]
For a belief to be meta-apt it must manifest a complete second-order compe-
tence. A belief will thus be meta-apt only if TTS is satisfied. It is easy to see
that, in consequence, a belief can be apt, without being meta-apt. This will
happen when the agent rises to the level of complete first-order competence
but is not so situated that there would be tell-tale signs if he didn’t. In that
case the agent will acquire animal knowledge, without acquiring reflective
knowledge.
According to Sosa, this is exactly what happens in Barns: Sosa accepts
that Barnes rises to the level of complete competence at the first order and
thus acquires animal knowledge. On the second order, however, things look
differently: if Barnes’s first-order competence were absent here, this would
be because Barnes is looking at a fake barn. In that case, there would be
nothing about the situation that would alert Barnes to this fact. That means
that Barnes does not satisfy TTS. As a result, Barnes does not rise to the level
of complete competence at the second order. Barnes’s belief does not qualify
as reflective knowledge [Sosa 2010: 473-74].
Crucially, according to Sosa, intuitions about knowledge track the pres-
ence and absence of reflective knowledge. Since Barnes does not attain re-
flective knowledge, the intuition of ignorance in Barns is duly explained.
Before moving on, I would like to discuss one immediate problem that
arises for Sosa’s account at this stage. To bring it out, consider first the fol-
lowing case:
Barns*. Barnes is driving through a part of the country featuring mostly fake barns.
In order to avoid people from forming false beliefs, the authorities have seen
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to it that the fake barns (and only the fake barns) are painted blue. In addi-
tion, they have placed signs at both ends of Fake Barn County alerting drivers
to the fact that all and only blue structures that look like barns are in fact
mere façades. Unfortunately, the sign at the end of the road at which Barnes
enters Fake Barn County had been vandalised the night before. As a result,
whilst driving through Fake Barn County, Barnes does not know that the blue
structures are fake barns or that most structures that look like barns are in fact
mere façades. Upon seeing one of the few (non-blue) real barns, Barnes forms
the belief that he is facing a barn. When Barnes exits Fake Barn County he
notices the sign.
Consider Barnes’s belief about the presence of a barn at the time at which
he first forms it (t0). Intuitively, at t0, Barnes’s belief falls short of knowl-
edge. Sosa wants to explain this intuition in terms of the absence of reflective
knowledge and that, in turn, in terms of TTS’s not being satisfied. Recall
that, according to TTS, the SI of a second-order competence will be satis-
fied only if the agent is so situated that were the first-order competence to be
absent, sooner or later there would be tell-tale signs alerting him to this fact.
Crucially, there is reason to believe that TTS is satisfied in Barns* at t0. After
all, if, at t0, the first-order competence were absent, this would be because the
structure Barnes is looking at is a blue fake barn—or so we may assume. In
that case, however, the relevant tell-tale signs do present themselves sooner
or later, viz. upon exiting Fake Barn County when Barnes passes by a sign
telling him that the blue barn-shaped objects are mere façades. In Barns*,
then, Barnes is so situated that if the first-order competence were absent,
sooner or later the would be tell-tale signs. TTS turns out to be satisfied. As
a result, Sosa’s envisaged explanation of the absence of reflective knowledge
at t0 in terms of TTS fails.
Fortunately, this problem can be solved. Sosa can simply strengthen TTS
in the following way. Rather, than allowing the tell-tell signs to present them-
selves sooner or later, Sosa can require that the relevant tell-tale signs present
themselves soon enough. If, in addition, it can be argued that in Barns*, the
tell-tale signs would not present themselves soon enough, Sosa’s explanation
of Barnes’s lack of knowledge will be reinstated.
Of course, the question that immediately arises at this stage is what counts
as soon enough. Curiously, there is reason to believe that Sosa cannot allow
the extension of ‘soon enough’ to extend to any times beyond the time of
belief-formation. To see this notice that we can easily set up Barns* in such
a way that Barnes notices the sign at t1, i.e. immediately after forming his
belief about the presence of the barn at t0. In that case, still Barnes’s belief
intuitively falls short of knowledge at t0. However, if t1 falls within the exten-
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sion of ‘soon enough’, then, at t0, Barnes will satisfy even the strengthened
version of TTS, for reasons already discussed. Once again, the envisaged
explanation of the absence of reflective knowledge at t0 in terms of TTS fails.
I take these considerations to indicate that, in order to successfully explain
the absence of reflective knowledge in cases like Barns, TTS will have to be
restricted to the time of belief-formation. For that reason, in the remainder of
the paper I will assume that, properly understood, Sosa’s crucial requirement
is the following:
TTS*. One must be so situated that, at the time of belief formation, there would be
tell-tale signs if the relevant complete first-order competence were absent.
3 Problems for Sosa
3.1 Frankfurt Cases
The first problem for Sosa I’d like to discuss concerns the second-order com-
petences required by reflective knowledge. Sosa’s account of these compe-
tences as competences that respond to the relevant tell-tale signs seems plau-
sible enough. What is less clear to me, however, is that such competences
must be manifested in order to acquire knowledge, at least if the SI include
TTS*. To see this consider first the following case:
Frame. Killer plans on murdering Victim. Controller, an agent of immense power,
wants Killer to be convicted for the crime. In order to ensure this he is pre-
pared to kill Victim himself and convincingly frame the deed on Killer if
Killer decides not to carry out his plan. Similarly, he will plant incriminating
evidence against Killer if Killer does not leave enough cues. Killer goes ahead
and murders Victim, leaving enough cues for Detective to mount a watertight
case against Killer. Controller never shows his hand.4
When Detective has completed his case against Killer, intuitively, he knows
that Killer did the deed. At the same time, Detective’s belief does not qual-
ify as reflective knowledge. If Detective’s complete first-order competence
had been absent, this would have been because Killer decided not to carry
out his plan or didn’t leave enough cues. In that case, however, Controller
would have stepped in and murdered Victim and/or planted the evidence in-
criminating Killer. In that case there would not have been tell-tale signs that
4 It should be said that I owe inspiration for this example to Harry Frankfurt [1969] who
uses examples with a similar structure to argue against the view that moral responsibility
requires the ability to do otherwise. For an argument that this kind of case poses a problem
for safety-based accounts of knowledge see [Author 2009].
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Detective’s first-order competence is absent. Given that absence of first-order
competence would not have been accompanied by tell-tale signs, Detective’s
second-order competence does not satisfy TTS*. By Sosa’s lights, his belief
does not qualify as reflective knowledge.5 This is, of course, bad news for
Sosa. After all, Detective’s belief intuitively qualifies as knowledge. If intu-
itions about knowledge track the presence and absence of reflective knowl-
edge, it looks as though we have a counterexample to Sosa’s account.6
As I see it the problem here is that the second-order competences are
construed in too strong a manner. More specifically, the difficulty arises from
TTS*, the requirement that one be so situated that there would be tell-tale
signs if one’s first-order competence were absent. What Frame highlights is
that one can have knowledge even when absence of competence would not
have been accompanied by tell-tale signs.
One promising way of avoiding this problem is by weakening TTS*. In-
stead of requiring that tell-tale signs would be present if the first-order com-
petence were absent, we might think of the second-order competences as
competences that are such that if they were to detect tell-tale signs as such,
this would duly be taken into account (henceforth ‘TTS**’). Notice that, on
TTS**, Detective has the complete second-order competence. After all, if
Detective were to detect anything fishy, he would suspend judgment. In that
case, Detective does acquire reflective knowledge after all. The counterex-
ample can be avoided.
Unfortunately, this alternative comes at a cost for Sosa. There is now
little hope for his intended explanation of the intuition of ignorance in Barns.
After all, here too, TTS** is satisfied: if Barnes were to detect tell-tale signs
as such, they would be duly taken into account. For instance, were Barnes
to look at a broken façade that exposes the structural elements behind it,
he would believe that he is not looking at a real barn. In consequence, if
TTS* is replaced by the weaker TTS**, Sosa’s explanation of the intuition
of ignorance in Barns will no longer work.
3.2 Lottery Cases
Let’s look at yet another case:
5 Notice that this will follow even on TTS. After all, we may assume that, had Controller
showed his hand, he would have seen to it that the relevant tell-tale signs would not surface
sooner or later either.
6 Note that we can set the case up in such a way that the closest worlds at which Controller
shows his hands are far-off. This will make things even trickier for Sosa. After all, in that
case, any temptation to regard manifestation of the complete second-order competence as
necessary for knowledge is further weakened.
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Lottery. Gambles tells his close friend Raffles that he has recently bought a ticket
in the state lottery, L. Based on the fact that the odds against winning are so
very high, Raffles comes to truly believe that Gambles’s ticket won’t win L.
Although the probabilistic evidence supporting Raffles’s belief is excellent
and the belief is true, Raffles does not know that his friend’s ticket won’t win
L.
To the best of my knowledge, Sosa does not discuss cases like Lottery
in his published work.7 That is not to say, however, that they don’t pose a
problem for him. On the contrary, there is excellent reason to think that Sosa
will struggle with these cases. To see this, let’s first ask whether Raffles’s
cognitive success manifests a complete first-order competence here. Before
answering this question, let’s ask whether Raffles rises to the level of com-
plete competence in this case. Very plausibly, the answer to this question is
‘yes’. After all, Raffles belief is produced by disposition that in his SH (Raf-
fles is awake, alert, etc.) and SI (the lottery is fair, etc.) corresponds to the
trigger-manifestation conditional: if Raffles were to believe that Gambles’s
ticket will lose, his belief would very likely be true. So the disposition that
produces Raffles’s belief qualifies as a complete cognitive competence. If
so, his cognitive performance (the belief issued by this disposition) manifests
a complete cognitive competence in this case. Notice, furthermore, that his
cognitive performance is also successful. After all, his belief that Gambles’s
ticket won’t win the lottery is true.
With these points in play, let’s return to the question whether Raffles’s
cognitive success manifest this complete competence in this case. Answer-
ing it is actually a bit tricky. The reason for this is that it does not follow from
Sosa’s account of aptness that cases in which performances are both success-
ful and manifest a complete competence are cases of apt performances, i.e.
cases of performances in which the success manifests a complete compe-
tence. That said, it is quite hard to see how cases of successful performance
that manifest a complete competence could still fail to be cases in which the
performance is apt. Think, for instance, of Archer once more. Consider a
case in which he is taking a shot in perfect conditions, (peak concentration,
no winds, etc.) that hits the target. What reason could there possibly be to
deny that his shot is apt? I, for one, can’t think of any. If so, it is fair to
assume that cases of performances that are successful and manifest complete
7 Note that [Greco 2003: §I.B] contains a brief discussion of Sosa on lottery cases. In
fact, Greco also notes that the intuition of ignorance cannot be explained in terms of absence
of reflective knowledge here. That said, Greco’s argument focuses mainly on an account of
such cases in terms of a safety condition on knowledge, which Sosa was sympathetic to at
the time, and does not provide a detailed argument that an explanation in terms of reflective
knowledge will not do.
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competences are also cases of apt performances. Given Raffles’s belief that
Gambles’s ticket won’t win the lottery is both successful (true) and manifests
a complete cognitive competence, there is thus reason to believe that it is
also apt. In other words, there is reason to believe that it qualifies as animal
knowledge.
Does Raffles’s true belief also qualify as reflective knowledge? Does
it manifest a complete second-order competence? First, note that we may
assume that Raffles’s belief does manifest the second-order monitoring com-
petence of the sort required for reflective knowledge. By way of evidence,
notice that we may assume that Raffles is such that had tell-tale signs been
detected by the competence, they would have duly been taken into account.
The crucial question, then, is whether Raffles’s rises to the level of complete
competence at the second-order as well. This question is also tricky to an-
swer. One reason for this is that we need to know whether TTS* is satisfied.
And, in order to ascertain this, we need to know what would have been the
case if Raffles’s complete first-order competence had been absent.
One might think that Raffles’s complete first-order competence would
have been absent in a case in which Gambles’s ticket wins L. Since, in that
case, there would not have been the required tell-tale signs, TTS* is not satis-
fied. Raffles’s belief does not manifest a complete second-order competence
and thus falls short of reflective knowledge. Unfortunately, there is reason to
think that this doesn’t work: Raffles’s complete first-order competence would
not have been absent in a case in which Gambles’s ticket wins L. After all,
even in that case, Raffles still satisfies the trigger-manifestation conditional:
if he were to believe that Gambles’s ticket loses, his belief is very likely true.
For that reason, the SI of Raffles’s first-order competence should include the
case in which Gambles’s ticket wins. It’s just that, in this case, the unlikely
possibility of failure materialises.
If the case in which Raffles’s first-order competence would have been
absent is not one in which Gambles’s ticket wins L, presumably it is either
a case (i) in which Raffles has no idea that Gambles owns a ticket to begin
with or else a case (ii) in which Raffles knows that Gambles does not own a
ticket. In both cases, there would be tell-tale signs that he does not have the
complete first-order competence (specifically: that he is in SI such that the
relevant trigger-manifestation conditional is not true of him). In case (i) the
tell-tale sign is the fact that Raffles has no idea that Gambles owns a ticket,
in case (ii) it’s the fact that Raffles knows that Gambles doesn’t own a ticket.
There is thus reason to believe that TTS* is satisfied.
This leads us immediately to another difficulty in ascertaining whether
Raffles’s second-order competence is complete here. Completeness requires
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that all SH and SI of the second-order competence are satisfied. So far, we
have only shown that one such SI, TTS*, is. What remains to be shown is
that the other SH and SI are satisfied as well. This task is complicated by the
fact that Sosa typically leaves the list of SH and SI open-ended. So how can
we possibly hope to answer this question?
The answer is: “By investigating trigger-manifestation conditionals.” If
relative to his SH and SI, Raffles satisfies the trigger-manifestation condi-
tional that corresponds to the second-order competence, Raffles rises to the
level of complete competence. What then is the trigger-manifestation con-
ditional for Raffles’s second-order competences? To answer this question,
recall that Sosa construes the second-order competences as default compe-
tences that assume (by default) that the complete first-order competence is
present. Given that this is so, the trigger-manifestation conditional corre-
sponding to such second-order competences will be conditionals of the form:
if—in suitable SH and SI—the second-order competence were to assume
that the complete first-order competence is present, then it would likely be
present. Crucially, there is excellent reason to believe that, in Lottery, the
relevant trigger-manifestation conditional is true of Raffles. After all, we
may assume that Raffles is in maximally favourable SH: he is awake, fo-
cused, at peak concentration, etc. Moreover, as we have already seen, TTS*
is satisfied: Raffles is so situated that if the complete first-order competence
were absent, then there would be tell-tale signs. Now consider: if—whilst
Raffles is awake, focused, at peak concentration, etc. and so situated that
if the complete first-order competence were absent, there would be tell-tale
signs—Raffles’s second-order competence were to assume that the complete
first-order competence is present, it would likely be present. This trigger-
manifestation conditional is very plausibly true. Since relative to Raffles’s SH
and SI, the trigger-manifestation conditional holds, Raffles’s second-order
competence is complete. In consequence, Raffles attains not only animal
knowledge, but also reflective knowledge. Sosa’s account makes the wrong
predictions in cases like Lottery, too.
3.3 Dreaming Scepticism
My last worry with Sosa’s account arises from another case which Sosa him-
self discusses. It takes the following shape:
Dream. Late at night, Wakes is sitting at home on his sofa and truly believes that
he is awake. However, Wakes might very easily have gone to bed earlier in
which case he would now lying in his bed dreaming that he is at the ball game,
travelling Asia or sitting at home on his sofa. In that case, Wakes would also
have believed, albeit now falsely, that he is awake [Sosa 2010: 467].
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Sosa grants that, intuitively, Wakes knows that he is awake. Given that Sosa
is right in that intuitions about knowledge track the presence and absence of
reflective knowledge, Sosa had better establish that Wakes’s belief qualifies
as reflective knowledge. Now, the question is whether Sosa can secure this
result. This task is complicated by the fact that Wakes is in a similar situation
to Barnes in that both of them might very easily have acquired false beliefs
instead without being in a position to know this. The challenge Sosa thus
faces is to show that Wakes’s belief qualifies as reflective knowledge without
compromising his earlier account of Barnes’s ignorance in terms of a lack of
reflective knowledge.
Sosa takes on the challenge in the following passage:
According to [Austin and Descartes], our dreams are incoherent, or
have a dreamlike quality (an Austinian quality that may or may not
be something other than the Cartesian incoherence). It’s just that once
asleep we are no longer in proper shape to take that into account. So,
once asleep, we lack the relevant competence. Even if, in line with
Austin and Descartes, we retain the situational element of that com-
plete second-order competence, we lose an essential inner component
in any case. Once asleep, we are in bad shape epistemically, with a con-
sequent loss of competence. But here’s the important point: [Wakes’s]
incompetence when asleep is of no relevance to whether he has the
complete second-order competence when awake and alert. So, this is
how [Wakes] is more fortunate than [Barnes]. This is why he attains a
level of knowledge denied to [Barnes].
[Sosa 2010: 474]
The question remains how good Sosa’s story is. In order to answer this
question, consider the following case:
Chocolates. Sweets is sitting in front of a box labelled ‘chocolates’. He has just
picked up one of them and is about to eat it: the chocolate is already touching
his lips.8 Unbeknownst to Sweets, the chocolate he is about to eat is the only
chocolate in a box full of items that look just like chocolates but aren’t.
Let’s ask whether Sweets knows that he is about eat a chocolate. Very plau-
sibly the answer to this question is ‘no’. The case is structurally analogous to
Barns. Notice also that, as a result, Sosa had better analyse the case as one in
which Sweets has animal knowledge but lacks reflective knowledge.
Of course, so far there is no special problem for Sosa. But now suppose
we add:
8 We may add that they haven’t come in contact with his taste buds yet and so Sweets
does not yet have a gustatory experience as of a chocolate.
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Chocolates, Continued. The fake chocolates are in fact drugs that upon contact
with the mucous membrane would instantly put Sweets to sleep and would
cause him to dream that he is sitting in front of a box of chocolates and is in
the process of eating one of them.
To begin with, notice that this addition does not alter the intuition that Sweets
does not know that he is about to eat a chocolate. With this point in play,
here, then, is the crucial question: Does Sweets have his complete second-
order competence? Given that dreams provide the required tell-tale signs, it
would seem that Sweets is fine on this front. Moreover, given that inability to
recognise dreams as such due to diminished competence leaves the second-
order competences intact, there are no problems here either. In this respect,
Chocolates is just like Dream. If so, and if, in Dream, Wakes retains his
second-order competence and acquires reflective knowledge through it, then
the same holds for Chocolates.
4 Conclusion
Sosa’s version of VE promises to explain the intuition that agents in Fake
Barn cases lack knowledge whilst granting that they attain successes because
of ability. This paper has shown that Sosa’s account of Fake Barn cases,
whilst initially attractive, is ultimately unsuccessful as it comes at too high a
cost: it leads him to mistaken predictions in Frankfurt-style as well as lottery
cases, and, what’s even worse, forces him down the road of dreaming scep-
ticism. For that reason, I conclude, Sosa joins the ranks of those who have
failed to provide an adequate solution to the Gettier problem.
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